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BID DEPOSITORIES UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
By BRUCE DUCKER*
The organization of bid depositories by large groups of spe-
cialized subcontractors in order to eliminate or at least substantially to
curtail the underhanded practices of bid peddling by subcontractors
and bid shopping by prime contractors- practices ultimately de-
structive of free and open competition -has come under attack
from the justice Department as being a restraint on trade and
violative of the Sherman Act. Mr. Ducker explains the bid deposi-
tory practice and its rationale, discusses the antitrust cases in point,
and concludes that such depositories are valuable deterrents to the
aforementioned deleterious practices and, therefore, their reason-
ableness under the Sherman Act should take into account this effect.
THE general construction industry - and in particular, the me-
chanical specialty trades - have long been plagued by the
practices of "bid peddling" and "bid shopping." That is, once the
prime contract has been awarded, subcontracts under it are often
renegotiated for prices lower than those quoted in the original bids.
Where an ambitious subcontractor takes the initiative, he is "ped-
dling" his bid; where the prime contractor seeks adjustment, he is
"shopping." Either practice, when carried to extremes, can undermine
the industry price structure and lead to chaotic competitive conditions.'
The immediate results may be several profitable jobs for prime con-
tractors; the eventual result must be the attrition of those craftsmen
who cannot afford to compete without a reasonable profit margin.
Bid depositories have proven to be an effective method of
controlling these practices. While a depository can conceivably
serve several trades, in practice each has functioned in one geographic
area for one specialty, traditionally for electrical, plumbing, air-
conditioning, and sheet metal subcontractors.
A depository is simply a service, run by a trade association, a
bank, or an independent agency, for the purpose of collecting all
subcontract bids on a particular job and distributing them to interested
general contractors. This service has no fixed procedure or form.
It can be varied by the terms of its agreement to meet the needs of
its creators. Nevertheless, most bid depositories develop operating
patterns similar to other like depositories. The advertisement of a
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1 See Report of the Federal Trade Commission, May 20, 1952, in Hearings on S. 2907
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 274-75
(1952); see generally H.R. REP. No. 434 (to accompany H.R. 7168), 85th Cong.,
1st Sess., at 5 (1957).
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construction job in a trade journal will often contain a notice of
bids for the several component trades. Through trade usage or
perhaps by a depository advertisement, the contractors in each
specialty learn that their depository will receive bids for that par-
ticular construction job until a specified time prior to the closing of
bids on the prime contract. The depository then holds these sub-
contract bids in confidence, immediately opening or distributing them
to interested prime contractors.2 The prime contractors who wish to
bid on the principal job then simply "plug in" the successful component
bid and recompute their own bid. The prime contractor thus cannot
circulate among interested subcontractors, trading one bid against
another. Similarly, the depository has recorded the amount and
nature of each bid submitted and, if its rules permit, can take action
against any bidder who later peddles that bid to land the job.
Since a depository by its nature regulates bidding practices, it
is subject to the broad proscriptions of sections one and two of the
Sherman Act.' The Act itself does not mention bidding practices;
nevertheless, bidding practices and bidding pools have been attacked
and altered by antitrust litigation. A bid depository operating for
the purpose of dividing profits is, not surprisingly, illegal.4 Similarly
prohibited are the comparing of bids,' fixing bid prices,6 group boy-
cotts, and customer or market allocations.7 These activities among
competitors constitute per se antitrust violations; they are neither
more nor less tolerable when performed through a bid pool.8
2 To the extent that the differences can be cost justified, depositories may allow one
subcontractor to submit bids of varying amounts to different prime contractors. For, as
every experienced estimator knows, certain prime contractors are easier to work with,
and therefore more profitable to work for. An estimating engineer may add as much
as an additional 10 percent "coordinating coefficient" to a job if it is to be performed
under a particularly obdurate contractor.
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 (1964), in pertinent part, declare:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal ....
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ....
For an excellent discussion of bid depositories in general see Schueller, Bid Deposi-
tories, 58 MICH. L. REv. 497 (1960).
4 United States v. Brooker Eng'r Co., 1940-43 Trade Cas. 1 56,183 (E.D. Mich. 1942).
5 United States v. Engineering Survey and Audit Co., Inc., 1940-43 Trade Cas. 56,019
(E.D. La. 1940).
6United States v. Associated Nevada Dairymen, Inc., 1955 Trade Gas. ff 68,172 (D.
Nev. 1955); United States v. American Lead Pencil Co., 1954 Trade Cas. 1 67,676
(D.N.J. 1954).
7 Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954).
8 Indeed, these activities are more easily proved illegal, as the very existence of a bid
pool evidences some concert among competitors. Therefore, participants in a depository
must proceed with both caution and counselling. See G. LAMB & S. KiTTELE, TRADE
ASSOCIATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.7 (1956).
1968
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
In short, whenever a bid depository unreasonably inhibits com-
petitive bidding, it is a combination in restraint of trade and violative
of the Sherman Act. The qualification of unreasonableness, however,
should be the basis for any judicial inquiry into a questionable
depository practice. Depositories patently control otherwise free
and rampant bidding. The critical issue is whether the extent of
that inhibition is justified - that is, reasonable - in the face of the
alternative: open and possibly destructive competition.'
It is notable that until recently most courts, upon finding
illegality, have abolished the entire depository, rather than merely
its offending aspects. In a case from the lumber industry,1" for
example, the depository itself was guiltless of any wrongdoing; its
members, however, had compared and rigged bids before submitting
them. A broad consent decree swept away the service along with the
illegal practices committed during its existence, but not necessarily
under its aegis. Again, in United States v. Detroit Sheet Metal &
Roofing Contractors Ass'n, Inc.,11 roofing contractors and their trade
association were prohibited, by consent decree, from entering into
any understanding with any other person for the following purposes:
(1) Collecting, disseminating, or exchanging information regarding
bids prior to their final submission to the awarding authority;
(2) fixing or maintaining any rules in computing bids; (3) affecting
the award of any contract for the construction or installation of
roofing; (4) influencing or interfering with the free choice of a
contract by any awarding authority; (5) restricting any contractor
from doing business with, or submitting any bid to, any awarding
authority; or (6) refraining from bidding or competing in the sale
or installment of built-up roofing. Thus, the court banned not only
the per se violations but also such defensible practices as uniformity
in bid terminology and disclosure of bonding capacity. More lament-
ably, the court published no consideration of possible competitive
justification or permissible depository practices.
Two recent cases yield some guidelines on pooling methods
which may be used to combat bid shopping and peddling. In United
States v. Bakersfield Associated Plumbing Contractors, Inc.," a Cali-
fornia depository agreement came under attack for three of its rules:
First, subcontractors were required to submit separate bids for plumb-
ing, heating, and ventilating portions of any construction contract;
9 The Sherman Act has, since earliest construction, been applied with a "rule of reason"
under which only unreasonable restraints of trade are illegal. See e.g., Standard Oil
Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
10 United States v. W.C. Bell Serv., Inc., 1940-43 Trade Cas. f 56,171 (D. Colo. 1941).
11 116 F. Supp. 81 (E.D. Mich. 1953).




second, the successful bidder paid a fee directly to the depository; and
third, any bidder was able to withdraw his bid, upon the payment of a
withdrawal fee, between the opening of bids by the depository and
their submittal to the general contractor.
The district court found all three of these practices unreasonably
restrictive of free and competitive bidding. The separate bid system
on its face limited the bidder's ability to offer any particular service
at the lowest possible price. If a subcontractor can save supply costs
by combining services, he should be allowed to bid in such a manner
that this saving is passed on to the builder, and eventually to the
owner.
The depository fee was also found to be a restraint on trade.
The proof showed that the fees collected under the rule produced
substantially more revenue than required for the ordinary operation
and maintenance of the depository. Since the fee had occasionally
been included by subcontractors as an element of their cost and
consequently passed on to the general contractor, the court apparently
felt that use of the depository unreasonably raised the price of doing
business without a commensurate benefit to the trade or to the
consuming public.
Finally, the withdrawal privilege had been abused. Evidence
was adduced that at least on two occasions, the successful bidder
had reimbursed the withdrawing bidder in the amount of the with-
drawal fee. The court appropriately found collusion among com-
petitors, constituting an unreasonable restraint on trade.
Nevertheless, with the exception of these three rules, the court
found that the bid depository agreement was not a per se violation
of the Sherman Act. In its analysis, the court noted that certain
restraints upon interstate commerce were designed to, and did in
fact, eliminate harmful bid peddling. 3 This is the first judicial
acknowledgement of the possibility that depository restraints may
be economically more reasonable than free bidding.
The second case, Mechanical Contractors Bid Depository v. Chris-
tiansen,14 contains more stringent boundaries of antitrust legality.
Depository rules against bid splitting and late bids were overturned in
13 1958 Trade Cas. 1 69,087, at 74,305:
The rules of the bid depository, other than Rules 6, 8, and 12 B, im-
posed only reasonable restraints upon interstate commerce in that they were
designed to and did eliminate the practice of bid peddling. The defendants
established the bid depository primarily to eliminate bid peddling and, except
as hereinbefore stated to the contrary, their purpose was not to place un-
reasonable restraints upon interstate commerce.
The effects, if any, on interstate commerce as a result of the enforcement
of the rules of the bid depository, other than Rules 6, 8, and 12 B, are specu-
lative and inconsequential.
14 352 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 918 (1966).
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Christiansen upon a rationale identical with that in Bakersfield. But
the thrust of the opinion dealt with a rule under which those general
contractors who elected to take bids from the depository were
required to award the subcontract to one of the depository bidders.
Since only members could submit bids through the depository, the
rule divided the market into depository members and nonmembers.
The proof at the trial showed that those general contractors who
violated the rule were boycotted by the member subcontractors. The
Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's holding that this rule,
considered with the others "and as implemented by the acts and
practices of the depository,"'" was a violation of sections one and
two of the Sherman Act.
The italicized qualification above cannot be overemphasized,
for it suggests those principles within which depositories may
operate. If depositories are to combat bid shopping and peddling,
they must be able to prohibit post-award negotiation between general
contractors and subcontractors. Of course, no prohibition is effective
unless it also includes a sanction, and the only commercially feasible
sanction which a group of subcontractors might hold over the prime
contractor is the requirement that if he solicits the depository bids,
he must use one of them. Christiansen does not interdict this sanction,
but when the sanction is combined with closed membership and
black-listing, it then becomes prohibited. Conceivably, a bid deposi-
tory whose rules include neither of these two additional sanctions, or
perhaps only one of them, would be tolerated in the Tenth Circuit.'"
Unless a depository can demand this commitment to accept one of its
own bids from general contractors, and unless it can enforce the com-
mitment by fine or suspension, it will not be able to lessen destructive
bid shopping or peddling. Any other purposes it might serve - bid
advertising, uniformity, cost analysis - have little competitive value
by comparison.
Exclusivity of use by the contractor is not the only "gray" area
of depository antitrust law. Whether the depository can be manda-
tory upon members and whether it may require bonding capacity
information on the bid are both debatable propositions. Admittedly,
the former would tend to controvert the principle of Addyston
Pipe that the crucial antitrust consideration is "the effect of the
combination in limiting and restricting the right of each of the
members to transact business in the ordinary way .... . The latter
15 Id. at 819 (emphasis added).
16 The modified Bakersfield decision approved a bid depository agreement with the fol-
lowing language: "[N]o bid shall be delivered to a general contractor until said con-
tractor has agreed in writing to accept the bid if it is the low bid accepted through the
depository." United States v. Bakersfield Associated Plumbing Contractors, Inc., 1959
Trade Cas. 69,266, at 75,039 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
17Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 245 (1899).
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would tend to prejudice a contractor, albeit with possible justifica-
tion, against subcontractors without the necessary financial history
to secure a bonding commitment.
There are other unresolved questions. A depository fee in
excess of that needed for simple administration may be economically
warranted if the depository were distinct from the industry and
therefore entitled to generate its own profits, or if it were rendering
additional services of compiling, analyzing, and publishing bids.
A standard form specifying that every component of the bid is
included unless otherwise noted would eliminate the practice of
"breaking out" items, i.e., altering the elements of one's bid after
bid opening, as an alternative method of bid peddling.
The reasonableness of bid depositories under the Sherman Act,
then, should depend upon the exigencies of the market place. An
industry riven by bid shopping must be allowed the competitive
tools necessary to unify itself. The applicable criteria for those
tools can be derived from neither static principle nor vagrant prece-
dent; like any antitrust guidelines, they must be sufficiently mal-
leable to adjust to the economics of the situation.
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